Th e conducted analysis evokes the polysemous character of the concept of laicism, which was infl uenced by modern political and philosophical ideas. Two positions have determined this: a diachronic one encompasses laicism as a process extended in time, and a synchronous one allows one to perceive the simultaneity of phenomena. Th us, the concept itself reveals its practical value, especially in the context of these challenges, which aff ect both the state crisis and the changing relationship between the State and the Church. Th is value is confi rmed by an important place in the secular research that is based on the principles of sovereignty, equality and separation. Th us, laicism postulated and implemented in the democratic system and its reference to fundamental values should support, above all, the importance of arguments, mutual persuasion and decision-making procedures based on consensus.
Introduction
Th e multithreading of the relationship between the «religious» world and the «laic» world is an essential inspiration for the exploration of the concept of 'laicism'. At the etymological level, the term was born in the nineteenth century and derives from the word laïc. In the religious space, laicism indicates non-affi liation to the clergy. Someone who is not a cleric is known as a layman. Th is rather theologically narrow concept was also confi rmed by the latest Church documents of the Catholic Church 1 . With time, however, the concept evolved into laïcque and indicates someone who is under the banner of laicism and free from the infl uence of confession, privileging its role as a member of a secular (civil) society. Etymologically, 'laicism' comes from the Latin laicus, which transposes Late Greek laïkos. Th is Greek adjective corresponds to the noun laos or populos (Cimbalo 2007, 269-270; Warhola, Bezci 2010) .
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However, accuracy of scientifi c refl ection requires, above all, the socio-political repercussions accompanying the practical implementation of secularity. Th erefore, the analyses undertaken for this study rightly highlight the disputes over the contemporary reception of the principles of laicism. Th e disputes clearly illustrate the risk of abuse that the ideologised form of laicism may take. Th e reasons include both the vague nature of the concept itself and the ambiguity in the implementation of the principle. A particular form of systematisation may be the proposition of assigning specifi c functions to contemporary laicism. Th us, the concept itself reveals its practical value, especially in the context of these challenges, which aff ect both the state crisis and the changing relationship between the State and the Church (Zagrebelsky 2010) 2 . Th e research area covered above also indicates the purpose of this consideration: the analysis of the concept of 'laicism' with embedded ambiguity. Th e analysis undertaken considers both the diachronic position, which recognises laicism as a process extended in time, and the synchronous position, allowing one to perceive the simultaneity of the phenomena occurring in it. Th e fi rst position was supported by the results of analyses carried out by specialists in the fi elds of political, philosophical, legal and sociological sciences. Th e second position refers to three selected issues that indicate the importance of the functions to be fulfi lled within the concept of laicism.
Th e adopted two research hypotheses support the implementation of the described goal: 1. Th e current ambiguous understanding of laicism is the result of a historical process infl uenced mainly by modern political and philosophical ideas; 2. Laicism has a polysemous attribute expressing itself in the functions currently assigned to it. In the course of the analysis, two methods have been found to fi t their specifi c applications. First is the comparative method, which relates to selected proposals systematising the phenomenon of laicism. Secondly is the historical method, which allows one to capture laicism as a process, granting its generalised description.
Th e ambiguity of the concept of laicism
Th e highly complex semantics of laicism can be recognized in reference to numerous scientifi c disciplines: philosophy (Miligi, Perazzoli 2010 , Macioce 2007 , Seidl 2010 , theology (Casula 2011), law (Bin, Brunelli, Pugiotto, Veronesi 2004 , Zagrebelsky 2014 , political science (Gauchet 1999; Magris 2008) or sociology (Donati 2008 ).
Laicism, now and then, undergoes attempts of systematization. For instance, an excerpt of paradigms regarding both the science of law and the history of law can be mentioned:
■ laicism as an autonomy of law (autonomy of the legal system in relation to the ethical and religious sphere); ■ laicism as a political autonomy (limitation of abuses of ecclesiastical authority vs. secular power, from theocratic forms to religious ones marked by anomalous «inter-ference»);
■ laicism as a limitation of politics (limiting the interference of secular authorities with religious authority, from various forms of jurisdiction to the latest forms of «hostile laicism»); ■ laicism as a religious pluralism (recognition and guarantee of religious freedom and religious pluralism); ■ protected laicism (indiff erence and alienation of the public sphere towards the religious factor, making laicism strive for self-protection, turns into a militant ideology); ■ laicism as a political pluralism (recognition and guarantee of individual freedom, as well as pluralism of cultures and traditions and, as a consequence, the rejection of the «ethical state» and every state's ideology).
Complementing the above theoretical indications is a reference to the formation of interpersonal relationships, which may aff ect the functionality of a specifi c community: laicism as a method that links non-believers and believers together and shapes conditions for coexistence between opposing values or ideas. Th e rejection of confl icting fundamentalisms and dogmatic limitations (Barbera 2007) should be considered crucial.
Th e variety mentioned above, considering historical changes, makes it impossible to speak about one laicism, or its uniform understanding and application to specifi c, culturally diff erent conditions (Dalla Torre 2007 , D'Uggento 2009 . On this value, polyhedral laicism was indicated by the signatories of the International Declaration on Laicism, a document signed by two hundred and fi ft y intellectuals from thirty countries and presented to the Senate of the French Republic: "Th e process of laicisation takes place when the state is no longer legitimized by religion or a specifi c school of thought when all citizens can intentionally deliberate, with equal rights and dignity, and when they can exercise, based on their sovereignty, political power […] . Th erefore, the elements of laicism necessarily appear in every society that wants to harmonise social relations marked by interests and multiple moral or religious concepts […] . Laicism is not the prerogative of any culture, no nation, no continent. It may exist in situations where the term has not been traditionally used" (Baubérot 2008, 7) 3 . Jean Baubérot, a French sociologist and considered to be the author of the sociology of laicism, presented a thorough analysis of the heterogeneity of laicism. In Les laïcités dans le monde (2007) , he distinguishes between three «thresholds» in the process of laicisation, referred to as "zigzag changes". He maintains that there is no one laicism, but many laicisms in the world, which are diversifi ed depending on the historical processes that shape them or the philosophical foundations they act in. Besides, the laity corresponds to various types of social, cultural and political realities. Th e purpose of their assessment should be to refer to useful indicators (Baubérot 2007, 9) .
Elements announcing the future laicism have already occurred in historical periods much older than western modernity 4 . In Europe, the acceptance of Christianity by Roman 4 Examples of such examples include Buddhist anti-clericalism; whose universalism comes from the fact that the religious formula of managing sacrum/profanum relations is subject to constant contestation. Another is the three forms of relationship between religion and politics in the tradition of Sunni Islam: unity in the person of the caliph, relativisation of religious authority in the sultanate and the practice of ijtihâd, which serves the contextualization and modernisation of shari'a (Baubérot 2008, 14; Ramadan 6 (1)/2018 emperors in the fourth century and the development of the christianitas idea, which has collapsed over time, were breakthrough event. Th e then binding concept was the model of a modern state, which presupposes a theological-political confi guration with absolutism and the theory of king's sovereignty in spiritual and earthly matters. For the moment of transition from prehistory to the history of laicism, one can recognise this as the «fi rst globalisation» (Baubérot 2008, 17-18) .
Th e philosophical and political dimensions usually determine the period of development of the idea of laicism. In the philosophical dimension the ideas and works of John Locke (the postulate of separation), Voltaire (religious intolerance) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (the secular religion) had a major infl uence in this respect. Th e political dimension was marked by the «enlightened despotism» and its representatives creating a form of authoritarian laicisation.
Characterizing the fi rst threshold of laicisation, it should be emphasised that states ceased to provide «salvation» to their citizens, focused on their temporal interests and pointed to their incompetence in religious matters. Th e laicisation of sovereignty and the dissociation between religious affi liation and citizenship appeared. Th ree factors accompanied the laicization of sovereignty and the dissociation between religious affi liation and citizenship: institutional fragmentation, social legitimisation and recognition of religious pluralism (oft en limited) by politics (Baubérot 2008, 46-48) .
Th e primary motive leading to the second threshold of laicisation was the idea of happiness, which, according to the assumptions of Enlightenment deism, is in the hands of the people. It was supported by the «second globalisation» and the accompanying events: independence struggles in Latin America, the development of the concept of secularisation and laicisation, the separation of churches and schools, and colonial expansion, especially of the Muslim world. Th ree characteristics marked the second globalisation: religion, mainly due to the autonomy of education, became a socially opulent institution; religious needs lost their objective value, becoming a «private matter», a personal choice; the practice of freedom of conscience based on the essential condition of dissociation between civil and religious affi liation (ibidem, 62-63) .
Th e nineteenth century was the time when the foundations of the philosophical foundations of atheism and the development of sciences were formed. Th is favoured the process of the third threshold, making contemporary societies more secularised, though not necessarily laic. Th e progressing process of laicisation took form in three ways: deinstitutionalization regarding institutions that destabilized religious structures, becoming promoters of laic symbolism; the crisis of moral socialization described by the supreme principle of "self-realization"; a new pluralistic reality that creates beliefs «without belonging» and in a syncretic manner (ibidem, 102-104) 5 . According to Baubérot (2007, 80-81) ., the observed processes led to geopolitical changes of laicism and was shaped by three determinants. First, decolonization allowed many 2008, [108] [109] [110] [111] [112] [113] [114] .
5 Although laicization has endured the medieval distinction between temporal authority and spiritual power, political power has not given up all religious dimensions altogether. For example, ideological monism, present in secular religions, became dominant in a totalitarian state and is defi ned as a secular religion or political religion. Both terms (models) were analysed in the works of many eminent thinkers, such as Ernst Kantorowicz, Hans Blumenberg, Raymond Aron, Jules Monnerot, Karl Polanyi, Eric Voegelin, Giovanni Gentile and Hannah Arendt (Gentile 2001, 25-67) . In this context, the notion of "civil religion" emerges from Robert Bellah (Bellah, 1967 , Adams, Schurb 2004 countries to emerge from Western rule. Second, state communism representing the form of totalitarian laicisation did not allow for the expression of democratic laicism and is why it has been identifi ed with offi cial atheism. Th ird, laicism connected with the development of the nation-state and its liberation from any religious infl uence With Baubérot's concept of zigzag changes, Pierpaolo Donati's proposition echoes the historical conditions of the polysemous character of the concept. Th e Italian sociologist and philosopher points to the three basic meanings of the term 'laicism', which, although used to this day, are rarely found in their «pure» defi nition. First, laicism in the pre-modern sense refers to the people (laikòs), that is, it characterises whoever is not a clergyman, is not privy, does not bear specifi c signs and acts on the basis of the distinction between the divine and the imperial. Second, laicism in the modern sense is the expression of thinking and acting based on the primacy of autonomous reason, approval for secularisation and recognition for the individual as such, which leads to neutrality towards any religion. Th ird, laicism in the postmodern sense is a secular (though not secularised) mentality that expresses the relationship between faith and reason without privileging either side. Th is third meaning distinguishes between faith and reason's spheres of infl uence and combines them where it is necessary and possible (Donati 2010, 70) .
Th e strong connection between the idea of laicism and Christian culture is indicated by Giuseppe Dalla Torre (2007) . He points out that the pursuit of a secular state, which was germinating and developing in the environments of ancient Christianity, encountered diffi culties as to the ways of affi rmation because of the tendency of a modern state to model itself on an ecclesiastical institution. Indicating the ambiguity of laicism, it refers to four paradigms.
Th e fi rst of these paradigms is the political and legal principle of sovereignty, which is described as the "cornerstone of modern public and constitutional law" (Dalla Torre 2007, 22) . Defi ned in a broader sense, this principle serves to show the ruling power of the fi nal instance in a political society and, consequently, to distinguish it from other associations whose organisation does not defi ne authority as supreme, unlimited and independent (Matteucci 2007, 909) . Sovereignty as the primacy of political power over any other authority signifi cantly impedes the implementation of authentic laicism, due to two diff erent orders of reference: actual and structural.
Th e actual order concerns the sovereignty that confers powers to the state also on the historical, social and public expression of religion. As a consequence, the state ceases to be impartial as it relates to religion and it may take the form of confessionalisation, ignorance pushing the individual's conscience into the private fi eld or explicitly combating the religious fact. Meanwhile, the foundation of the laic state is the principle of its incompetence in religious matter. Th e structural order leads to the inevitable identifi cation of legality with legitimacy, the operation of the law according to justice. In this way, the objective boundary between the political authority and the natural law is violated. Sovereignty understood in such a way turns into absolute power: the state abandons secular positions and, from the recognition of objective, universal and unchanging truth, is willing to go to the "pantheon of religious and ethical denominations to embrace one of them" (Dalla Torre 2007). As a result, the choice of neutrality ceases to be neutral as it means taking one cultural position among others. In summary, it should be noted that the affi rmation of laicism proceeds through the acquisition of the idea of sovereignty as the attribute of the state. It should be rather a non-absolute but relative idea that fi nds real limitations (Dalla Torre 2007, 22-25) .
Th e second paradigm that shapes laicism is the attitude of ' favour religionis'. Th is expression is not a description of the attitude toward religion as a measure of tolerance or intolerance towards others. On the contrary, it is the attitude of the state and its political system related to the recognition of religious values as something positive and deserving of legal protection which, going beyond the limits of ordinary legality, would be considered a category of the right to freedom (religious freedom). Th is perspective assumes two critical assumptions. Th e fi rst is the concept of «relative sovereignty», which emphasises the incompetence of the state to indicate elections in religious matters, while demanding the abandonment of secularist positions. Th e second is recognition of the public character of religion itself without identifi cation between politics and religion. By evoking the concept of laicism, religion manifests itself and is expressed publicly, thus contributing to the relationship between the state and civil society (ibidem, 25-30) .
Th e third paradigm is the relationship between religious freedom and equality. Th e right to religious freedom, constituting a conditio sine qua non of the existence of laicism, should be understood in two meanings. Th e negative meaning is expressed through the guarantee of protection against external coercion in religious matters, regardless of its origin. Th e positive meaning is the ability to publicly express convictions of conscience, giving this testimony both through acts of worship, but also other attitudes important for religion.
Th is is accompanied by the principle of equality implemented in two dimensions: formal and material. In the formal dimension, it postulates respect for existing norms and non-abuse of discretionary power in the situation of religious diversity. Th is oft en leads to a dilemma around the position of various values in society 6 . In the material dimension on the other hand, equality implies the inclusion of public institutions in respecting the obligation to remove obstacles that prevent the exercise of freedoms and rights. Th anks to them, the state is involved in creating conditions that both the religious and non-believers to fully experience religious freedom in an individual, collective and institutional manner (ibidem, 30-34) .
Th e last paradigm regarding laicism is the principle of separation between the state and the church, understood as «distinction». By diff erentiating the state's order and the individual order of individual religious denominations, this distinction remains the supreme postulate of laicism, guaranteed both by national constitutions and concordats signed with the Catholic Church. Th ese provisions make for a socially «visible» religion: their absence, according to Dalla Torre, would result in limiting religion to the private sphere, putting it outside the public dimension and making it legally unrecognised. Th e question of the discussion remains about the nature of the public manifestation of religion, while at the same time caring about not interfering in the proper order of the state. Th erefore, this distinction does not mean either confusion or mutual ignorance 7 . Relations between 6 Recalling the so-called the «common ethical minimum», which is often the result of mediation today, Dalla Torre recalls the importance of justice: "laicism of the law is expressed as the adherence towards the legislator, and therefore in compliance with the norm of ethics that truly binds the law: justice" (Dalla Torre 2007, 33) .
7 It is worth emphasising that the postulated «distinction» is an important part of the current teaching of the Catholic Church: "The Church and the political community in their fi elds are autonomous and independent from each other. Both, under diff erent titles, are devoted to the personal and social vocation of the same men. The more that both foster sounder cooperation between themselves with due consideration for the circumstances of time and place, the more eff ective will their service be exercised for the good of all" (The Second Vatican Council, 76). 6(1)/2018 the state and religious denominations, implemented under various legislative regulations, should strengthen the legal order appropriate to guarantee the identity of each present religion, eliminate possible obstacles and cooperation on this distinction (ibidem, 34-37).
Laicism functions
An expression of the polysemous character of laicism is the appearing in the public discourse tensions between faith and reason or between politics and religion. As noted by Sergio Belardinelli, "the distinction between religion and politics, pluralism and the freedom of liberal-democratic institutions, awareness (especially from non-believers) that all this has developed due to the large contribution of the Christian faith, and awareness (especially from believers) that in a pluralistic society it is necessary to be able to convey the truths of faith, avoiding pretensions that they become binding for all without the consent of even the majority of those concerned. Th ese features are signifi cant for the laic model that developed in the West" (Belardinelli 2009, 54-55) .
Th e attempt to systematise the phenomenon of laicism is a form of meeting the just mentioned tensions. An example of the realisation of this postulate is the reference of laicism to contemporary challenges that aff ect both the state crisis and the changing relations between the State and the Church. For this study, three were considered representative: relativism, the public role of religion and truth.
Th e belief emphasising the open character of modern society remains marked by the diversity of positions taken concerning relativism. In the search for the necessary agreement, it is worth recalling the concept of laicism and its universal acceptance of two underlying assumptions. First of all, society is open because it is laic (secular), and secondly, the said openness should not be interpreted as indiff erentism to everything. In this way, laicism reveals its real roots and allows it to emerge from its relativistic self-understanding.
In this context, there is a signifi cant problem of legal and political refl ection on the religious neutrality of the state and the accompanying risk of a «political religion» (Kepel 2004) . Th is is related to attempts to exclude religious content from public discourse. Th e model thus created leads to the "sacralisation of the political system based on the irrevocable monopoly of power, on the ideological monism, imposed and unconditional subordination of the individual and the community to its code of commandments. Th is order aims to pervade every aspect of life, individual and collective" (Gentile 2001, XI-II-XIV) . A diff erent proposition could be a political culture whose identity emphasises the dialogical character. It remains open to what is «other» and thus creates a secular framework that has nothing to do with the sacralisation of the political system. It allows preserving the inviolability of human rights, including religious freedom and appreciates the importance of culture and institutions guaranteeing ideological pluralism, political competition, a non-ideological activity of power, and the ability to appeal it with peaceful and constitutional means (Belardinelli 2009, 57-61) .
Another function of laicism is included concerning the public role of religion, where the state plays a key role. By creating political and legal guarantees of peaceful coexistence of citizens with diff erent religious and religious affi liations, the state should be the fi rst to pursue the principle of laicism. However, the postulated peaceful pluralism between reli-gious denominations cannot be guaranteed in cases when the state would remain either confessional or set laicist positions, pushing all religious denominations into the private sphere (ibidem, 62) 8 . However, the choice of privatisation of all religions as a way to resolve potential tensions would be contrary to the principle of religious freedom as well as the secular state itself. Another of the proposals speaks of respecting the sovereignty of the constitutional state, which is accompanied by recognition for the public role of religion and its contribution to the development of the political community and civil society (Crepaldi 2010, 27-36; Manent 1998) .
Th e last of the selected issues, taking place in the ongoing public discourse, is the dispute over the understanding of the truth, its transfer to the public space and ways of protection against ideologization. In this respect too, the concept of laicism can be helpful. As Jürgen Habermas (2005, 47) wrote, "a constitutional democratic state generally represents a form of government demanding, so to speak, sensitivity to the truth". Th is implies not only the cognitive value of truth but also the awareness of the abuses that may accompany its discovery. Th erefore, the «dispute over truth» in the democratic public space should be based on the principle formulated by Gian Enrico Rusconi (2000, 7) : "all citizens, believers and non-believers, exchange their arguments and start decision-making procedures on the basis of an agreement without asking themselves authoritatively about reasons for your truths of faith or your beliefs in general. What counts is mutual persuasion and faithful observance of procedures".
Summary
Th e analysis undertaken confi rms the direct impact of historical changes on the process of laicism, the scope of its impact and the sustainability of the transposition brought. Moreover, remaining as thoroughly contemporary phenomenon, laicism is realised through a series of functions essential in the context of disputes over the issue of relativism, the public place of religion or the understanding of the truth. Th e hypotheses put forward in the introduction, although confi rmed in the course of the research, do not exhaust the complexity of the phenomenon in question, nor the scale of the on-going process.
Th us, laicism postulated and implemented in the democratic system, its reference to fundamental values, both secular and religious, should support, above all, the importance of arguments, mutual persuasion and decision-making procedures based on consensus. However, in order to be able to consider all such diverse elements of democratic order, an ethos is needed that will be the right inspiration to follow them. Besides, considering the diff erence between the accuracy of arguments and the procedures by which they become socially binding for everyone, the ethos protects the rights of minorities in a given community. It also contributes to the growth of virtues and respect for civil liberties. Th us, to paraphrase the well-known Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde dictum, one can state that the above references are necessary conditions for the existence of a laic, liberal and democratic state which the state itself cannot guarantee 9 . Th us, the German lawyer and philosopher points to the axiological foundations of a democratic system whose operating principle is healthy laicism. Moreover, although this foundation is oft en criticised as part of the current public debate, one should bear in mind the risk of a modern democratic model moving from being «true» to being «accepted».
